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for

**SOFTWARE MODEM FOR COMMUNICATING DATA USING
SEPARATE CHANNELS FOR DATA AND CONTROL CODES**

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SOFTWARE MODEM FOR COMMUNICATING DATA USING SEPARATE CHANNELS FOR DATA AND CONTROL CODES

BACKGROUND OF THE INVENTION

1. FIELD OF THE INVENTION

This invention relates generally to modem communications and, more particularly, to a software modem for communicating data using separate channels for data and control codes.

2. DESCRIPTION OF THE RELATED ART

In recent years cellular telephones have become increasingly popular. A cellular telephone is one example of what is referred to as a "mobile station" or "mobile terminal." A mobile station can take on various forms other than a cellular telephone, including a computer (e.g., a notebook computer) with mobile communication capabilities.

Telecommunications services are provided between a cellular telecommunications network and a mobile station over an air interface, *e.g.*, over radio frequencies. Typically, each subscriber having a mobile station is assigned a unique International Mobile Subscriber Identity (IMSI). At any moment, an active mobile station may be in communication over the air interface with one or more base stations. The base stations are, in turn, managed by base station controllers, also known as radio network controllers. A base station controller together with its base stations comprise a base station system. The base station controllers of a base station system are connected via control nodes to a core telecommunications network, such as the publicly switched telephone network (PSTN). One type of standardized mobile telecommunications scheme is the Global System for Mobile communications (GSM). GSM

includes standards that specify functions and interfaces for various types of services. GSM systems may be used for transmitting both voice and data signals.

A particular base station may be shared among multiple mobile stations. Because the radio spectrum is a limited resource, the bandwidth is divided using combination of Time-
5 Division and Frequency-Division Multiple Access (TDMA/FDMA). FDMA involves dividing the maximum frequency bandwidth (*e.g.*, 25 MHz) into 124 carrier frequencies spaced 200 kHz apart. A particular base station may be assigned one or more carrier frequencies. Each carrier frequency is, in turn, divided into time slots. During an active
10 session between the base station and the mobile station, the base station assigns the mobile unit a frequency, a power level, and a time slot for upstream transmissions from the mobile station to the base station. The base station also communicates a particular frequency and time slot for downstream transmissions from the base station destined for the mobile station.

The fundamental unit of time defined in GSM is referred to as a burst period, which lasts 15/26 ms (or approx. 0.577 ms). Eight burst periods are grouped into a TDMA frame
15 (120/26 ms, or approx. 4.615 ms), which is the basic unit for the definition of logical channels. One physical channel is defined as one burst period per frame. Individual channels are defined by the number and position of their corresponding burst periods.

GSM frames, each frame having 8 burst periods, are grouped into superframes (*e.g.*, groups of 51 frames) that include both traffic (*i.e.*, voice or data signals) and control
20 information. The control information is conveyed over common channels defined in the superframe structure. Common channels can be accessed both by idle mode and dedicated mode mobile stations. The common channels are used by idle mode mobile stations to exchange signaling information for changing to dedicated mode in response to incoming or

outgoing calls. Mobile stations already in the dedicated mode monitor the surrounding base stations for handover and other information.

The common channels include:

a Broadcast Control Channel (BCCH) used to continually broadcasts
information including the base station identity, frequency allocations,
and frequency-hopping sequences;

a Frequency Correction Channel (FCCH) and Synchronization Channel (SCH)
used to synchronize the mobile station to the time slot structure of a
cell by defining the boundaries of burst periods, and the time slot
numbering (*i.e.*, every cell in a GSM network broadcasts exactly one
FCCH and one SCH, which are, by definition, sent on time slot
number 0 within a TDMA frame);

a Random Access Channel (RACH) used by the mobile station to request
access to the network;

a Paging Channel (PCH) used to alert the mobile station of an incoming call;
and

an Access Grant Channel (AGCH) used to allocate a Stand-alone Dedicated
Control Channel (SDCCH) to a mobile station for signaling (*i.e.*, to
obtain a dedicated channel) following a request on the RACH.

For security reasons, GSM data is transmitted in an encrypted form. Because a
wireless medium can be accessed by anyone, authentication is a significant element of a
mobile network. Authentication involves both the mobile station and the base station. A

Subscriber Identification Module (SIM) card is installed in each mobile station. Each subscriber is assigned a secret key. One copy of the secret key is stored in the SIM card, and another copy is stored in a protected database on the communications network that may be accessed by the base station. During an authentication event, the base station generates a random number that it sends to the mobile station. The mobile station uses the random number, in conjunction with the secret key and a ciphering algorithm (*e.g.*, A3), to generate a signed response that is sent back to the base station. If the signed response sent by the mobile station matches the one calculated by network, the subscriber is authenticated. The base station encrypts data transmitted to the mobile station using the secret key. Similarly, the mobile station encrypts data it transmits to the base station using the secret key. After a transmission received by the mobile station is decrypted, various control information, including the assigned power level, frequency, and time slot for a particular mobile station may be determined by the mobile station.

Generally, communication systems are described in terms of layers. The first layer, responsible for the actual transmission of a data carrying signal across the transmission medium, is referred to as the physical layer (PHY). The physical layer groups digital data and generates a modulated waveform based on the data in accordance with the particular transmission scheme. In GSM, the physical layer generates the transmission waveform and transmits during the assigned transmit time slot of the mobile station. Similarly, the receiving portion of the physical layer identifies data destined for the mobile station during the assigned receipt time slot.

The second layer, referred to as a protocol layer, processes digital data received by the physical layer to identify information contained therein. For example, in a GSM system, decryption of the data is a protocol layer function. Notice that changes in the operating

parameters of the physical layer are identified only after decryption and processing by the protocol layer. Although this particular interdependency does not generally cause a problem in a purely hardware implementation, it may cause a problem when all or portions of the protocol layer are implemented in software.

5 Certain computer systems, especially portable notebook computers, may be equipped with wireless modems. One trend in modem technology involves the use of software modems that implement some of the real-time functions of traditional hardware modems using software routines. Because the hardware complexity of a software modem is less than a hardware counterpart, it is generally less expensive as well as more flexible. For example, 10 the protocol layer decryption and processing may be implemented partially or entirely with software.

Software systems, such as PC systems, run interface control software in operating systems environments as software drivers. These drivers are responsible for communicating to the hardware devices and operate at a privileged level in the operating system. Other 15 software applications are precluded from affecting the drivers. However, because drivers are not protected from other drivers, a variety of problems can occur that might affect the operation of a driver, such as by corrupting its operation. These effects may be caused accidentally, or may be caused by purposeful hacking. A corrupted (or co-opted) driver might cause additional problems outside the computer, such as causing a phone line or 20 wireless channel to be used, operating an external peripheral, or deleting important data.

Because the operating parameters of the physical layer, which control the operation of the transmitter of the mobile station, are controlled by the protocol layer using software, it may be possible for a computer program or virus to take control of the mobile station and cause it to accidentally or purposefully transmit outside of its assigned time slot. A wireless

communications network, such as a cellular network, relies on a shared infrastructure. A mobile station must adhere to the 'rules of the road' or it may cause interference on the network.

If certain functions of the mobile station are controlled in software, a programmer may determine how the GSM control frames are decoded and how the transmitter module is triggered. A virus may then be written and spread over the network to infiltrate the software-based mobile stations. Then, on a particular time and date, the virus could take direct control of the mobile station and transmit continuously or intermittently and inundate the base stations and other mobile units with random frequencies and full power. Such a virus design could enable and disable at random times to avoid detection, robbing the air-time supplier of some or all of his available bandwidth and may even cause a complete shutdown of the network. Such an attack may take only a few affected devices (*i.e.*, as few as one) per cell to disable the cell completely.

The security problems associated with mobile stations operating in a shared infrastructure may be segregated into three levels of severity: tamper-proof, non-tamperproof, and class break. First, a hardware/firmware implementation (such as a cell-phone) is the hardest with which to tamper, because each device must be acquired individually and modified (*i.e.*, tamper-proof). On the other hand, a software-based solution is easier to tamper with, as a hacker can concentrate on a software-only debugger environment (*i.e.*, non-tamper-proof). Finally, a system with the ability to be tampered with that is similar on all systems and allows the tampering to be distributed to a large number of systems of the same type is susceptible to a 'class-break.'

A software wireless modem is susceptible not only to a class-break, but also it is among those devices whose code may be accessed from the same layer as IP (internet

protocol) or another portable code access mechanism. Many software wireless modems may be integrated into computers coupled to networks or the Internet. Such an arrangement increases the susceptibility of the software to being tampered with and controlled.

Communication devices implementing other communications protocols using software may also be susceptible to some of the problems identified above, but to differing degrees and levels of consequence. For example, software drivers for communication devices using copper subscriber lines, such voice band modems (V.90), asymmetric digital subscriber line (DSL) modems, home phone line networks (HomePNA), *etc.*, may be attacked, resulting in the subscriber line being disabled or improperly used. For example, a group of infected software modems may be used in a denial of service attack to continuously place calls to a predetermined number and overwhelm the destination. The software modem could also be used to prevent outgoing or incoming calls on the subscriber line or disrupt HomePNA traffic. Other wireless communication devices implemented in software, such as wireless network devices, could also be commandeered to disrupt traffic on the wireless network.

The present invention is directed to overcoming, or at least reducing the effects of, one or more of the problems set forth above.

SUMMARY OF THE INVENTION

One aspect of the present invention is seen in a communications system including a physical layer hardware unit and a processing unit. The physical layer hardware unit is adapted to receive user data over a first communications channel and control codes over a second communications channel. The physical layer hardware unit is further adapted to transmit an upstream data signal over the first communications channel based on transmission assignments defined by the control codes. The processing unit is adapted to execute a

software driver for interfacing with the physical layer hardware unit. The software driver includes program instructions for implementing a protocol layer to decrypt the user data and provide upstream data to the physical layer hardware unit for generation of the upstream data signal.

5 Another aspect of the present invention is seen in a method for configuring a transceiver. the method includes receiving user data over a first communications channel; receiving control codes over a second communications channel; and transmitting an upstream signal over the first communications channel based on transmission assignments defined by the control codes.

BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS

The invention may be understood by reference to the following description taken in conjunction with the accompanying drawings, in which like reference numerals identify like elements, and in which:

15 Figure 1 is a simplified block diagram of a communications system in accordance with one illustrative embodiment of the present invention;

Figure 2 is a simplified block diagram of a physical layer in a software modem in the communications system of Figure 1; and

Figure 3 is a simplified block diagram of an exemplary computer that embodies a user station in the communications system of Figure 1.

20 While the invention is susceptible to various modifications and alternative forms, specific embodiments thereof have been shown by way of example in the drawings and are herein described in detail. It should be understood, however, that the description herein of

specific embodiments is not intended to limit the invention to the particular forms disclosed, but on the contrary, the intention is to cover all modifications, equivalents, and alternatives falling within the spirit and scope of the invention as defined by the appended claims.

DETAILED DESCRIPTION OF SPECIFIC EMBODIMENTS

5 Illustrative embodiments of the invention are described below. In the interest of clarity, not all features of an actual implementation are described in this specification. It will of course be appreciated that in the development of any such actual embodiment, numerous implementation-specific decisions must be made to achieve the developers' specific goals, such as compliance with system-related and business-related constraints, which will vary from one implementation to another. Moreover, it will be appreciated that such a development effort might be complex and time-consuming, but would nevertheless be a routine undertaking for those of ordinary skill in the art having the benefit of this disclosure.

Referring to Figure 1, a block diagram of a communications system 10 is provided. The communications system 10 includes a user station 20 in communication with a central station 30 over a communication channel 40. In the illustrated embodiment, the user station 20 is a mobile computing device using a software modem 50 to communicate in accordance with a wireless communication protocol, such as GSM. The central station 30 may be a shared base station capable of serving a plurality of subscribers. Although the invention is described as it may be implemented in a wireless environment, its application is not so limited. The teachings herein may be applied to other communication environments using software implemented communication protocols (e.g., V.90, ADSL, HomePNA, Wireless LAN, etc.).

The user station 20 may comprise a variety of computing devices, such as a desktop computer, a notebook computer, a personal data assistant (PDA), etc. For purposes of

illustration, the user station 20 is described as it may be implemented using a notebook computer. The software modem 50 may be installed as an internal resource. As will be appreciated by those of ordinary skill in the art, the software modem 50 includes a physical layer (PHY) 70 implemented in hardware and a protocol layer 80 implemented in software.

- 5 For purposes of illustration, the functions of the software modem 50 are described as they might be implemented for a GSM communication protocol, although other protocols may be used.

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10 The PHY layer 70 converts digital transmit signals into an analog transmit waveform and converts an incoming analog received waveform into digital received signals. For transmit signals, the output signal from the protocol layer 80 includes the transmit “on-air” information modulated about a zero Hz carrier (*i.e.*, a carrierless signal). The PHY layer 70 mixes (*i.e.*, mixing may also be referred to as upconverting) the carrierless transmit signal generated by the protocol layer 80 in accordance with assigned time slot, frequency, and power level assignments communicated to the user station 20 by the central station 30 to
15 generate the actual analog waveform transmitted by the PHY layer 70.

The central station 30 also communicates time slot and frequency assignments to the user station 20 for incoming data. The incoming analog receive waveform is sampled and downconverted based on the assigned time slot and frequency parameters to recreate a carrierless (*i.e.*, modulated about zero Hz) receive waveform. The protocol layer 80 receives
20 the carrierless receive waveform from the PHY layer 70 and performs baseband processing, decryption, and decoding to regenerate the received data.

Collectively, the time slot, frequency, and power level (*i.e.*, for transmit data only) assignments are referred to as control codes. The particular algorithms used for implementing the software modem 50 are described by the particular industry standards (*e.g.*,

GSM standards) and are well known to those of ordinary skill in the art, so for clarity and ease of illustration they are not detailed herein, except as they are modified in accordance with the present invention.

In the communications system 10 of the instant invention, the central station 30 transmits user data in accordance with traditional GSM techniques. The user data is transmitted in an encrypted form using the assigned time slots and frequencies. The central station 30 is adapted to transmit control codes to the user station 20 on a separate channel than the user data. The control codes may be encrypted or unencrypted. The complexity of the encryption algorithm employed for the control codes, in embodiments where encryption is selected, is of a lesser complexity than the algorithm used for the user data. As such, the PHY layer 70 includes a simple demodulator for detecting (*i.e.*, and decrypting, if necessary) the control codes and configuring its transmit and receive functions in accordance with the assigned control codes. Such an arrangement protects the security of the user data to prevent eavesdropping, but allows the PHY layer 70 to directly read the control codes and configure its transceiver parameters without requiring processing by the protocol layer 80. Hence, if the protocol layer 80 is corrupted by a virus, it may not be commandeered to cause the software modem 50 to broadcast outside of its assigned time slot and frequency windows. A virus could deleteriously affect the operation of the infected unit, but it could not cause the infected unit to interfere with other users of the communications system 10. In such a manner, the likelihood of a class-break fault having the potential to disrupt or disable the communication system 10 is reduced.

In an exemplary embodiment, described with reference to the simplified block diagram of the PHY layer 70 depicted in Figure 2, the control codes are transmitted as a separate signal that may be synchronized with the standard GSM data-carrying signal.

Because less data is transmitted associated with the control codes, a simpler transmission scheme may be possible. Other information carried on the control channels may still be included with the user data in the typical GSM format. However, the control channel information relating to the control codes is segregated.

5 As seen in Figure 2, the PHY layer 70 includes a shared analog front end 71 for sampling the receive signal. The digital receive samples are provided to a downconverter 72 for generating a zero Hz modulated receive waveform, which is in turn passed to the protocol layer 80. The digital receive samples are also provided to a demodulator 73. The demodulator 73 detects a signal containing the control codes, demodulates the signal, decrypts and decompresses the received signal, and identifies the assigned control codes for the PHY layer 70. Control logic 74 receives the control codes from the demodulator 73. For generating a transmit waveform, an upconverter 75 receives a digital transmit signal modulated about a zero Hz carrier from the protocol layer 80 and mixes the signal in accordance with the assigned transmit parameters. The control logic 74 configures the upconverter 75 to transmit the upstream data in accordance with the assigned power level, frequency, and time slots received in the signal processed by the demodulator 73. The control logic 74 also configures the downconverter 72 to receive incoming data at the assigned frequency and time slot.

There are numerous possible transmission schemes possible for sending the control code signal, depending on the specific implementation. For example, a simple frequency shift keying (FSK) or a simple quadrature amplitude modulation (QAM) technique may be used. The control channels may be addressed to particular phones and may use a simple message based protocol, such as a high level data link control (HDLC) technique, for

example. Some messages within the control channel may not be amenable to a retransmit type of error protection, so a forward error control technique may also be employed.

The control channel may be encrypted using one of several different encryption schemes known in the art. Typical encryption schemes involve the following elements:

5 authentication; key and algorithm negotiation; and encryption/decryption. The authentication step typically uses secure storage of a shared secret, $S1$, (*i.e.*, the SIM Card) and some algorithm that combines the shared secret and some random value. One such algorithm would be the Secure Hash Standard (SHA1) hash, but other equivalent algorithms abound. The protocol involves the transmission of the random value ($N1$) from the network to the mobile station. The mobile station then combines $N1$ and $S1$ using a function ($F1$) and returns the SHA1 Hash of $F1(N1, S1)$. The network independently computes the value of this hash and compares to the value received from the mobile station. A match results implies a successful authentication. After authentication the mobile station and the network can conduct further exchanges to agree on algorithm for the encryption of the channel data, and on the key generation process. One example would be for both to identify a Triple Data Encryption Standard (3DES), or in the future, an Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) as the selected algorithm and to mutually agree on a key length. Once these parameters are defined, a new function $F2$ could combine $S1$ with $N1$ to generate a key of appropriate length. $Key1 = F2(N1, S1)$. Following key generation, all further traffic on the control channel would be encrypted/decrypted using $Key1$. From time to time upon agreement, additional keys (*e.g.*, $Key2$, $Key3$, *etc.*) could be generated and used.

In an alternative embodiment, the above scheme may be implemented using public key cryptography. The authentication credential, $S1$, would be replaced by the private key of the subscriber. In this case, the network would have prior knowledge of the public key of the

subscriber. To authenticate, the mobile station would sign a message containing N1 and return this to the network. Verification of the signature using the public key of the subscriber would result in successful authentication. The Mobile station could also be aware of the public key of the network and could authenticate the network via a similar process.

5 Once authentication has been completed, the network could encrypt the session key (Key1) (along with appropriate padding using random data) using the public key of the subscriber and forward this to the Mobile station. Only the mobile station knowing the subscriber private key could decrypt the message and recover the session key. From this point forward the symmetric encryption of the control channel would proceed as above.

10 Turning now to Figure 3, a block diagram of the user station 20 embodied in a computer 100 is provided. The computer 100 includes a processor complex 110. For clarity and ease of understanding not all of the elements making up the processor complex 110 are described in detail. Such details are well known to those of ordinary skill in the art, and may vary based on the particular computer vendor and microprocessor type. Typically, the
15 processor complex 110 includes a microprocessor, cache memories, system memory, a system bus, a graphics controller, and other devices, depending on the specific implementation.

20 The processor complex 110 is coupled to a peripheral bus 120, such as a peripheral component interface (PCI) bus. Typically a bridge unit (*i.e.*, north bridge) in the processor complex 110 couples the system bus to the peripheral bus 120. A south bridge 150 is coupled to the peripheral bus 120. The south bridge 150 interfaces with a low pin count (LPC) bus 160 that hosts a system basic input output system (BIOS) memory 170, a universal serial bus (USB) 180 adapted to interface with a variety of peripherals (*e.g.*, keyboard, mouse, printer, scanner, scanner) (not shown), an enhanced integrated drive electronics (EIDE) bus 190 for

interfacing with a hard disk drive 200 and a CD-ROM drive (not shown), and an integrated packet bus (IPB) 210.

The IPB bus 210 hosts the hardware portion of the software modem 50. In the illustrated embodiment, the software modem 50 is hosted on an advanced communications riser (ACR) card 215. Specifications for the ACR card 215 and the IPB bus 210 are available from the ACR Special Interest Group (ACRSIG.ORG). The software modem 50 includes a PHY hardware unit 220 and a radio 230. In the illustrated embodiment, the radio 230 is adapted to transmit and receive GSM signals. Collectively, the PHY hardware unit 220 and the radio 230 form the PHY layer 70 (see Figure 1).

The processor complex 110 executes program instructions encoded in a modem driver 240. Collectively, the processor complex 110 and the modem driver 240 implement the functions of the protocol layer 80 (see Figure 1). The modem driver 240 performs the baseband processing necessary to reconstruct the user data from the received samples (*i.e.*, deciphering, burst disassembling, de-interleaving, and speech decoding). However, because the PHY layer 70 has independently ascertained its transmission assignments, the software driver 240 needs only to pass upstream data to the PHY hardware unit 220 and receive incoming user data from the PHY hardware unit 220 as appropriate. The PHY hardware unit 220 is responsible for ensuring that the upstream data is only transmitted during the assigned time slot and at the assigned frequency. The PHY hardware unit 220 may also be adapted, based on its knowledge of the time slot assignments for incoming data, to transfer only those bursts associated with the assigned time slots to the modem driver 240. Transferring only the data received during the assigned time slots reduces the workload on the modem driver 240, thus freeing up resources in the processor complex 110 for other tasks.